| 1 | Introduction: Why study political economy and development? Motivation and course overview | Political Economy and Economic Development: Introduction (PDF) | Recitation 0: Introduction to Stata (PDF) |
| 2 | The Role of Leaders and Democratic Institutions | Leaders and Democratic Institutions (PDF)
| Recitation 1: Linear Regression Models and the Wald Estimator (PDF) |
| 3 | The Deep Determinants of Economic Development: Macro Evidence | The Deep Determinants of Economic Development: Macro Evidence (PDF) | No recitation |
| 4 | The Deep Determinants of Economic Development: Micro Evidence | The Deep Determinants of Economic Development: Micro Evidence (PDF) | No recitation |
| 5 | None Available | No notes | No Recitation |
| 6 | The Median Voter Theorem | The Median Voter Theorem (PDF) | Recitation 2: Fixed Effects and Regression Discontinuity (PDF) |
| 7 | The Median Voter Theorem (cont.) | No notes | No recitation |
| 8 | Voting in Practice: Citizen-Candidate Models, Politician Identity and the Failure of the Median Voter Theorem | Voting In Practice (PDF) | No recitation |
| 9 | Voting in Practice: Agency Models | Selection, Moral Hazard, and Voting (PDF) | Recitation 3: Moral Hazard (PDF) |
| 10 | Voting in Practice: Agency Models (cont.) | No notes | No recitation |
| 11 | Voting in Practice: Vote buying and voter intimidation | No notes | Recitation 4: Deep Determinants of Economic Development and Pande (2003) (PDF) |
| 12 | Sometimes It Gets Complicated: Condorcet’s Paradox and Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem | Sometimes It Gets Complicated: Condorcet’s Paradox and Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (PDF) | No recitation |
| 13 | Midterm | No notes | No recitation |
| 14 | Good vs. Bad Dictatorships | Dictatorships (PDF - 1.1MB) | Recitation 5: Models of Participation (PDF) |
| 15 | Commitment problems in Dictatorship | No notes | No recitation |
| 16 | The Logic of Collective Action | Collective Action Lecture 1 (PDF) | No recitation |
| 17 | Ethnic Heterogeneity and Contributions to Public Goods | Collective Action Lecture 2 (PDF) | Recitation 6: Relationship Between Regime Type and Economic Outcomes and A Related Question: The Size of the State and the Government (PDF) |
| 18 | Monitoring and Collective Action Problems | No notes | No recitation |
| 19 | Recovery from Civil War. Special | Conflict Lecture 1 (PDF - 1.2MB) | Recitation 7: The Free Rider Problem and Social Norm and Social Pressure (PDF) |
| 20 | Why Do Wars Happen? | No notes | No recitation |
| 21 | Civil War | No notes | Recitation 8: Introduction to Game Theory (PDF) |
| 22 | Is Corruption Inefficient? | Corruption Lecture 1 (PDF) | No recitation |
| 23 | The Corrupt Official’s Decision Problem: Balancing Risks, Rents, and Incentives | Corruption Lecture 2 (PDF) | Recitation 9: Measurement of Corruption and Corrupt People (PDF) |
| 24 | The Industrial Organization of Corruption | Corruption Lecture 3 (PDF) | No recitation |
| 25 | Politicians and Firms | Corruption Lecture 4 (PDF) | Recitation 10: Review Session for the Final Exam and Theory Problem (PDF) |
| 26 | Wrap Up | No notes | No recitation |
