

mas.s62

lecture 23

New Directions in Crypto

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today

future developments:

block / committed bloom filters

sharding

accumulators

UTXO commitments

block filters

first: what is a bloom filter

makeFilter([]obj) -> filter

matchFilter(filter, obj) -> bool

can have false positives but not
false negatives

block filters

current SPV model

**client makes filter of all their
utxos and addresses**

sends filter to server

server matches filter w/ each block

server sends only matching txs

block filters
current SPV model
bad for privacy
sending filter, not utxo / adr list
but nearly the same effect
slow for servers

block filters

new(ish) idea: reverse this model

server makes filter from txs in block

client requests filter

client matches filter to own utxos

client requests whole block on match

block filters

better privacy: server only learns
which blocks interesting to client

low CPU use for server

harder to lie / omit (?)

higher network traffic for client

current development: "neutrino"

sharding

mainly worked on for Ethereum

common from database world:

d data, n servers

don't store $d*n$, store $\sim d$, and

shard data over all servers, so each holds (lim) d/n data

sharding

difficult in blockchain / consensus /
adversarial environment

need to prevent spending invalid
coins

split single utxo set into multiple
smaller shards

need swaps between shards

multicoin vs shards

multiple utxo sets is what we've got!

Cryptocurrencies: **1614** • Markets: **10776** • Market Cap: **\$434,694,870,823** • 24h Vol: **\$23,844,104,203**

Is this "sharding"?

multicoin vs shards

multiple utxo sets is what we've got!

Cryptocurrencies: **1614** • Markets: **10776** • Market Cap: **\$434,694,870,823** • 24h Vol: **\$23,844,104,203**

Is this "sharding"?

want more than just swaps; need

fungibility between shards

real scalability improvement

(if it works!)

Accumulators

cryptographic sets

inclusion / exclusion proofs

`add(accum, obj) -> accum`

`del(accum, obj) -> accum`

`prove(accum, obj) -> bool`

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simple example: composite numbers

prime accumulator

accumulates primes. To "add", multiply. To "delete", divide.

add(3, 5) -> 15

prime accumulator

accumulates primes. To "add", multiply. To "delete", divide.

`add(3, 5) -> 15`

`add(15, 7) -> 105`

prime accumulator

accumulates primes. To "add",
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add(3, 5) -> 15

add(15, 7) -> 105

del(105, 5) -> 21

prime accumulator

accumulates primes. To "add", multiply. To "delete", divide.

add(3, 5) -> 15

add(15, 7) -> 105

del(105, 5) -> 21

prove(21, 7) -> true

RSA accumulators

constant size accumulator, proofs

efficient operations

... but trusted setup

(composite $n = p * q$ with unknown p, q)

other accumulators

some are 1-way (can't delete)

some can be batched, some can't

some have trusted setup

different tradeoffs for use case

utxo vs stxo inclusion

accumulators

great if you could get it working

no more UTXO set, just accumulator

constant size, regardless of set

small proofs; wallets track proofs

accumulators

profs are $O(1)$? $O(\log(n))$?

$n = \text{txs? blocks? aggregation?}$

transitioning: need some bridge node

actually faster? Bitcoin UTXO set

only ~4GB

UTX0 commitments

exists in some coins (ETH), not yet
in Bitcoin

simplest: take hash(UTX0 set), put it
in coinbase tx

UTXO commitments

somewhat more useful: Merkle root of UTXO set in coinbase tx every block

Can then "prove" an output exists

UTXO commitments

somewhat more useful: Merkle root of UTXO set in coinbase tx every block

Can then "prove" an output exists

(prove with SPV security)

UTXO commitments

skip years of initial block download!

only verify last ~6 months of txs

if everyone's been wrong for 6 months
we have bigger problems, right?

UTXO commitments

issues

timing: adding even 1s in creating /
verifying a block centralizes mining

encourages more SPV-level

verification (trust the miners)

"there's a better way to do this"

hash based, EC, RSA

more research required

Lots of topics in this area to
improve:

privacy

scalability

functionality

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