

# 14.12 Game Theory Lecture Notes

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# Contents

<b>1</b>	<b>Introduction</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>2</b>	<b>Decision Theory</b>	<b>9</b>
2.1	The basic theory of choice . . . . .	9
2.2	Decision-making under uncertainty . . . . .	10
2.3	Modeling Strategic Situations . . . . .	15
2.4	Attitudes Towards Risk . . . . .	18
2.4.1	Risk sharing . . . . .	20
2.4.2	Insurance . . . . .	20
<b>3</b>	<b>Representation of Games</b>	<b>23</b>
3.1	Normal form . . . . .	24
3.2	Extensive form . . . . .	24
3.3	Strategies . . . . .	27
<b>4</b>	<b>Dominance</b>	<b>33</b>
4.1	Rationality and Dominance . . . . .	33
4.2	Dominant-strategy equilibrium . . . . .	36
<b>5</b>	<b>Rationalizability</b>	<b>41</b>
<b>6</b>	<b>Nash Equilibrium</b>	<b>47</b>
6.1	Introduction and Definition . . . . .	47
6.2	Mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium . . . . .	50
6.3	Evolution of Hawks and Doves . . . . .	52

<b>7</b>	<b>Application: Imperfect Competition</b>	<b>57</b>
7.1	Cournot (Quantity) Competition . . . . .	57
7.1.1	Cournot Duopoly . . . . .	59
7.1.2	Cournot Oligopoly . . . . .	63
7.2	Bertrand (Price) Competition . . . . .	65
7.2.1	Nash Equilibrium . . . . .	66
7.2.2	Rationalizability with discrete prices . . . . .	66
7.2.3	Price competition with search costs . . . . .	69
<b>8</b>	<b>Backward Induction</b>	<b>73</b>
<b>9</b>	<b>Application: Negotiation</b>	<b>85</b>
9.1	Congressional Bargaining—Voting with a Binary Agenda . . . . .	85
9.2	Pre-trial Negotiations . . . . .	88
9.3	Sequential Bargaining . . . . .	92
<b>10</b>	<b>Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibrium</b>	<b>95</b>
<b>11</b>	<b>Application: Imperfect Competition</b>	<b>103</b>
11.1	Cournot (Quantity) Competition . . . . .	103
11.1.1	Cournot Duopoly . . . . .	104
11.1.2	Cournot Oligopoly . . . . .	109
11.2	Bertrand (Price) Competition . . . . .	111
11.2.1	Nash Equilibrium . . . . .	112
11.2.2	Rationalizability with discrete prices . . . . .	113
11.2.3	Price competition with search costs . . . . .	115
<b>12</b>	<b>Repeated Games</b>	<b>119</b>
12.1	Finitely-repeated games . . . . .	119
12.2	Infinitely repeated games with observed actions . . . . .	126
<b>13</b>	<b>Application: Implicit Cartels</b>	<b>135</b>
13.1	Infinitely Repeated Cournot Oligopoly . . . . .	136
13.2	Monopoly Production with Patient Firms . . . . .	136
13.3	Optimal Production Level with a Fixed $\delta$ . . . . .	138

13.4 Reward and Punishment: Carrot-Stick Strategies . . . . .	140
13.5 Price Wars . . . . .	143
13.6 Exercises with Solutions . . . . .	146
<b>14 Static Games with Incomplete Information</b>	<b>149</b>
14.1 Examples of Previous Exam Questions with Solutions . . . . .	157
<b>15 Static Applications with Incomplete Information</b>	<b>159</b>
15.1 Cournot Duopoly with incomplete information . . . . .	160
15.2 First-price Auction . . . . .	162
15.3 Double Auction . . . . .	166
15.4 Investment in a Joint Project . . . . .	171
15.5 Exercises . . . . .	176
<b>16 Dynamic Games with Incomplete Information</b>	<b>183</b>
16.1 Sequential Equilibrium . . . . .	183
16.2 Sequential equilibrium in Beer and Quiche Game . . . . .	189
16.3 A Simple example of Reputation Formation . . . . .	196
16.4 Bargaining with Incomplete Information . . . . .	199



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